Criminal Law- False Pretenses - Partner Fraudulently Obtaining Partnership Funds by Haerle, Paul R.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 53 Issue 3 
1955 
Criminal Law- False Pretenses - Partner Fraudulently Obtaining 
Partnership Funds 
Paul R. Haerle 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Paul R. Haerle, Criminal Law- False Pretenses - Partner Fraudulently Obtaining Partnership Funds, 53 
MICH. L. REV. 474 (2021). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol53/iss3/11 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
474 Mi:cmGAN LAw REvmw [ Vol. 53 
· CRIMINAL LAw-FALsE PRETENSES-PARTNER FRAUDULENTLY OBTAINING 
PARTNERSHIP FUNDs-Defendant and another were equal partners in a used car 
business. Defendant took in an automobile, paying for it with his own funds. 
Representing that he had paid more than he actually had, he induced his 
partner to write him a check drawn on the partnership account. Defendant was 
indicted for obtaining half of the excess by false pretenses. The district court 
directed a verdict of acquittal. On appeal by the state, held, affirmed, three 
justices dissenting. A partner cannot be guilty of obtaining by false pretenses 
from the partnership; the statute1 in question specifies that it must be "from 
1 Iowa Code Ann. (1950) §713.1. 
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another," whereas a partner has an interest in all the partnership assets. State 
v. Quinn, (Iowa 1954) 64 N.W. (2d) 323. 
Direct support in this country on the issue raised is confined to two dicta,2 
both in agreement with the position of the majority. One text writer discusses 
the point3 and, though also supporting the holding, his authority is only one 
English decision which, significantly, is based more on the grounds of practical 
financial management of the partnership than on the conceptualistic grounds of 
the partner's undivided interest in the funds of the fum.4 The many cases hold-
ing that a partner cannot be guilty of larceny5 or emhezzlement6 from the part-
nership give added support to the holding, as in both situations the courts base 
their views on the "from another" clauses of the statutes or the defendant's 
undivided interest in all the partnership assets or hoth.7 But it may be doubted 
that the ends of criminal deterrence are served by such a line of decisions. In the 
embezzlement and larceny cases, for instance, it is hard to see that converting 
the assets of a going partnership is less reprehensible than when the partnership 
contract is executory,8 or after dissolution.9 On the same policy basis, there can 
he little differentiation between the instant case and one in which the false 
pretenses induced the victim to join the firm and place his money in the part-
nership funds, from which the defendant obtained them.10 Under existing 
2 State v. Grumbles, 100 S.C. 238, 84 S.E. 783 (1915); State v. Simmons, 209 S.C. 
531, 41 S.E. (2d) 217 (1947). The former is even vague as to the charge: "Larceny after 
breach of trust with fraudulent intent." 
s 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAw, 12th ed., §1470 (1932). 
4 Regina v. Evans, Le. & Ca. 252 at 257, 169 Eng. Rep. 1385 (1862). "Now, inas-
much as, before there could be any division of profit, those expenses would have to be paid 
out of the capital fund, those charges [defendant's overcharging on commissions] would be 
matter of account between the parties. • • • The act of the defendant was no more than a 
misrepresentation, which would be overhauled when the accounts were gone into." It may 
be noted that the English statute on false pretenses then in effect (Larceny Act of 1861, 
24 & 25 Viet. c. 96, §88) was aimed at "Whosoever shall by any false Pretense obtain 
from any other Person • ••• " Italics added. 
Sir J. F. Stephen commented: "I am unable to follow the reasoning of this judge-
ment." DxcBST OF THE CRIMINAL LAw, 4th ed., art. 329, illustration, n. 3 (1887). 
IS People v. Dudley, 97 N.Y.S. (2d) 358 (1950); annotation, 169 A.L.R. 372 (1947). 
As to larceny between tenants in common, see 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAw, 12th ed., 
§1162 (1932). 
6Ex parte Sanders, 23 Ariz. 20, 201 P. 93, 17 A.L.R. 980 at 982 (1921); Pierce v. 
Commonwealth, 210 Ky. 465, 276 S.W. 135 (1925); State v. Ossendorf, 357 Mo. 366, 208 
S.W. (2d) 209 (1948); 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAw, 12th ed., §§1264, 1282, 1304 
(1932); CLARK AND MAltsHALL, LAw OF CRIMEs, 5th ed., §347 (1952). Contra, State 
v. Sasso, 20 N.J. Super. 158, 89 A. (2d) 489 (1952). Contra as to cotenancy: Common-
wealth v. Bovaird, 373 Pa. 47, 95 A. (2d) 173 (1953), noted in 102 UNIV. PA. L. RBv. 
136 (1953); 29 N.Y. UNIV. L. RBv. 759 (1954). 
7 See State v. Kusnick, 45 Ohio St. 535, 15 N.E. 481 (1888); 102 Umv. PA. L. 
RBv. 136 at 137 (1953). 
8 Larceny: State v. Brown, 38 Mont. 309, 99 P. 954 (1909). See State v. Foot, 100 
Mont. 33, 48 P. (2d) 1113 (1935). Embezzlement: Napoleon v. State, 3 Tex. App. 522 
(1878). See Ray v. State, 48 Tex. Crim. Rep. 122, 86 S.W. 761 (1905). 
9 Larceny: See Phelps v. State, 109 Ga. 115, 34 S.E. 210 (1899). Embezzlement: 
State v. Matthews, 129 Ind. 281, 28 N.E. 703 (1891); Sharpe v. Johnston, 59 Mo. 557 
(1875). Contra, State v. Snell, 9 R.I. 112 (1868). 
10 People v. Cravens, 79 Cal. App. (2d) 658, 180 P. (2d) 453 (1947). 
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Iowa law, the court could have found guilt by either of two paths. First, it could 
have followed the view of the vigorous dissent and held that the partnership 
was a separate entity, which had the entire interest in the assets. There is 
authority for the separate entity position, 11 especially in the absence of the 
Uniform Partnership Act with its non-entity or aggregate theory.12 Secondly, 
the court could have expanded on the position suggested by the Pennsylvania 
court in Commonwealth 11. B011aird18 and held that the partnership assets were 
divisible, hence the defendant could be convicted for appropriating what was 
not his share.14 Either position would satisfy the "from another" test, the 
requirement that the property taken be entirely that of another. But it is sug-
gested that both of these courses might only increase the confusion in the title 
and possession aspects of theft offenses.15 Rather, the solution would seem to lie 
with the adoption of statutes covering the matter. One type makes such an 
appropriation by a partner a misdemeanor, 16 while another eliminates any 
defense to larceny17 or embezzlement18 based on partial ownership. Though 
this latter type has been interpeted in a hypertechnical manner so as to exclude 
partners, 19 it is susceptible of a more liberal construction.20 
Paul R. Haerle 
11 Jensen v. Wiersma, 185 Iowa 551, 170 N.W. 780 (1919); Soursos v. Mason City, 
230 Iowa 157, 296 N.W. 807 (1941); State v. Pielsticker, 118 Neb. 419, 225 N.W. 51 
(1929); Dunbar v. Farnum, 109 Vt. 313, 196 A. 237 (1937); 13 IowA L. R:l!v. 463 
(1928); 15 IowA L. R:l!v. 186 (1930); 41 CoL. L. R:l!v. 698 (1941). 
12 MEcHEM, ELEMENTS OF PARTNI!RSIDP, 2d ed., §6 (1920); Drake, ''Partnership 
Entity and Tenancy in Partnership: The Struggle for a Definition," 15 MrcH. L. R:l!v. 
609 (1917). 
13 Note 6 supra. As the latter note points out, the decision can be attacked because of 
its reliance on the defendant's status as agent for the cotenancy; a partner has an equivalent 
agency status, but is not liable for embezzlement as such. 2 BURDICK, LAW OF CRIME §575d 
(1946). Contra, State v. Sasso, note 6 supra. 
14 The indictment in the principal case may have been drawn on this theory as it 
alleged that the defendant obtained only half of the excess and obtained it from his 
partner. 
15 Beale, "The Borderland of Larceny,'' 6 HARV, L. R:l!v. 244 (1892); 20 CoL. L. 
R:l!v. 318 (1920). 
16 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1945) tit. 18, §4835. See Commonwealth v. Moyer, 83 
Pa. D. & C. 271 (1952); Md. Code Ann. (Flack, 1951) art. 27, §200. As to embezzlement 
from voluntary associations, see Mass. Laws Ann. (1933) c. 266, §§58, 59; Commonwealth 
v. Novick, 248 Mass. 317, 142 N.E. 771 (1924). 
17 Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947) §622.02; Wash. Rev. Code (1952), §9.54.060; Nev. 
Comp. Laws (1929) §10339. 
18 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §750.181; Wis. Stat. (1953) §343.20(2). See A.L.I., 
Model Penal Code (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1954) §206.11(1). 
19 State v. Eberhart, 106 Wash. 222, 179 P. 853 (1919); State v. Elsbury, 63 Nev. 
463, 175 P. (2d) 430, 169 A.L.R. 364 at 372 (1946), noted in 32 MINN. L. R:l!v. 68 
(1947). 
20 State v. MacGregor, 202 Minn. 579, 279 N.W. 372 (1938). 
